Chaos is known as a natural candidate for cryptography applications owing to its properties such as unpredictability and initial state sensitivity. However, certain chaos-based cryptosystems have been proven to exhibit various security defects because their used chaotic maps do not have complex dynamical behaviors. To address this problem, this paper introduces a cosine-transform-based chaotic system (CTBCS). Using two chaotic maps as seed maps, the CTBCS can produce chaotic maps with complex dynamical behaviors. For illustration, we produce three chaotic maps using the CTBCS and analyze their chaos complexity. Using one of the generated chaotic maps, we further propose an image encryption scheme. The encryption scheme uses high-efficiency scrambling to separate adjacent pixels and employs random order substitution to spread a small change in the plain-image to all pixels of the cipher-image. The performance evaluation demonstrates that the chaotic maps generated by the CTBCS exhibit substantially more complicated chaotic behaviors than the existing ones. The simulation results indicate the reliability of the proposed image encryption scheme. Moreover, the security analysis demonstrates that the proposed image encryption scheme provides a higher level of security than several advanced image encryption schemes.
Introduction
At present, a large amount of digital information is generated and transmitted through various networks every moment [23] . The digital image is a widely used data format, as it carries information in a visualized manner. Among the images spreading across networks, some are secret images that owners do not want others to access without authorization. A typical example could be the military secret image. Thus, it is extremely important to protect the contents of these secret images. To protect digital images, researchers have developed different types of technologies, such as data hiding [29] , watermarking [10] , and encryption [9, 27] . Among these technologies, image encryption offers the most straightforward method, by transforming meaningful images into unrecognized noise-like ones [13, 24, 25 ] . An image encryption algorithm generally follows the well-known confusion-diffusion concept [7, 16, 44] . The confusion property is achieved by randomly separating adjacent image pixels, while the diffusion property can be obtained by spreading a small change in the plain-image to all pixels of the cipher-image [41, 43] . One can reconstruct the original image information only when owning the correct secret key. Without the correct key, one cannot access any information from the original image [19, 48] .
To date, numerous image encryption algorithms have been proposed [6, 26] . Among all technologies used in image encryption, chaos theory has attracted the most attention from researchers. Chaotic behavior is random, unpredictable, nonlinear behavior [22, 35] . A chaotic system is a mathematical model or an equation for describing chaotic behaviors. It possesses many unique properties, such as dense periodic orbits, unpredictability, and initial state sensitivity [15] . These properties can satisfy the requirements of image encryption [14] . Ever since Fridrich first designed an image encryption scheme using a two-dimensional chaotic map in [11] , researchers have developed various image encryption schemes using chaos [15, 20, 45] .
In a chaos-based encryption scheme, the security level relies strongly on the complexity of its used chaotic map. However, existing chaotic maps may exhibit drawbacks in different aspects. Firstly, existing chaotic maps may demonstrate chaos degradation when they are implemented in finite precision platforms, as their output states cannot be distributed uniformly [34] . Secondly, they do not have complex behaviors, making their trajectories easily predicted using certain technologies [8] . Moreover, their chaotic ranges are either narrow or discontinuous [17] . If a chaotic map has narrow or discontinuous chaotic ranges, its chaos properties may be destroyed when its parameters are disturbed by certain external factors such as noise [42] . Reports have indicated that several image encryption schemes using existing chaotic maps may be successfully attacked [39] .
In recent years, several new chaotic maps have been developed for image encryption [46] . However, these works also exhibit certain drawbacks. Some of these chaotic maps have periodic windows, where they may fall into nonchaotic ranges. Moreover, their outputs cannot be randomly distributed in the entire data range, which may not achieve high randomness.
To address these issues, this work proposes a cosine-transform-based chaotic system (CTBCS) to generate chaotic maps possessing complex behaviors. As opposed to existing chaotic maps with specified definitions, the CTBCS provides a general framework and can produce new chaotic maps using any two chaotic maps. As examples, we produce three chaotic maps using the CTBCS and apply one of these to design an image encryption algorithm. The contributions and novelty of this work are summarized as follows.
(1) We develop the CTBCS as a general chaotic framework. Using existing chaotic maps as two seed maps, the CTBCS can generate numerous new chaotic maps with excellent performance. Three sample chaotic maps are generated to demonstrate the feasibility of the CTBCS. (2) Utilizing the LSC map produced by the CTBCS, we propose an LSC map-based image encryption scheme (LSC-IES).
(3) We estimate the chaos performance of these sample chaotic maps of the CTBCS, and the results demonstrate that the chaotic maps produced by CTBCS exhibit complex chaotic behaviors. (4) The simulation and security analysis demonstrate that LSC-IES can encrypt various types of images into unrecognized cipher-images and achieve a higher level of security than several advanced image encryption algorithms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the CTBCS and provides three new chaotic maps of the CTBCS. Section 3 introduces the LSC-IES using one new chaotic map. Section 4 evaluates the chaos performance of the newly obtained chaotic maps by means of the CTBCS. Section 5 simulates the LSC-IES using different types of digital images and then compares it with other encryption algorithms. Section 6 concludes the paper.
CTBCS
This section presents the proposed CTBCS and analyzes its properties. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the CTBCS, three sample chaotic maps are generated using existing chaotic maps.
Structure of CTBCS
The proposed CTBCS is designed to address the disadvantages of existing chaotic maps in frail chaos and weak dynamical behaviors. Mathematically, the CTBCS can be represented as
where F ( a , x i ) and G ( b , x i ) are two existing chaotic maps known as seed maps, a and b are their control parameters, and the variable β is a shifting constant (we set β = −0 . 5 in this paper).
As indicated in Eq. (1) , the CTBCS first combines the outputs of F ( a , x i ) and G ( b , x i ) with a shifting constant β and then performs a cosine transform to generate the output. The combination operation can effectively shuffle the chaos dynamics of the two seed maps, and the cosine transform exhibits very complex nonlinearity. Thus, the new chaotic maps produced by the CTBCS have complex behaviors. Because the seed maps F ( a , x i ) and G ( b , x i ) in the CTBCS can be any existing chaotic maps, users have the flexibility to use different settings of existing maps to produce numerous new chaotic maps. 
New chaotic maps
To illustrate the effectiveness of the CTBCS, this section generates three one-dimensional (1D) chaotic maps utilizing the existing Logistic, Sine, and Tent maps as seed maps. The three existing chaotic maps can be mathematically defined as Logistic map :
Sine map :
The variable r is the control parameter of the Logistic, Sine, and Tent maps, while r ∈ [0, 1]. Setting the above three chaotic maps to be the two seed maps in Eq. (1) , we can obtain three new 1D chaotic maps, the definitions of which are displayed in Table 1 . The Logistic-Sine-Cosine (LSC) map is generated using the Logistic map as F ( a , x i ) and the Sine map as G ( b , x i ). The Sine-Tent-Cosine (STC) map is generated using the Sine map as F ( a , x i ) and the Tent map as G ( b , x i ). The Tent-Logistic-Cosine (TLC) map is generated using the Tent map as F ( a , x i ) and the Logistic map as G ( b , x i ). We set parameter a as r and parameter b as 1 − r, where r is the parameter of the generated chaotic maps.
LSC-IES
When chaotic maps are used in cryptography, their complexity dominates the security levels of the corresponding cryptography systems. In this section, we design the LSC-IES using the LSC map produced by the CTBCS. It adopts the wellknown confusion-diffusion structure, which is an encryption framework with a high level of security [31] . Fig. 1 illustrates the structure of the LSC-IES. The secure key K produces initial states for the LSC map to generate chaotic sequences, which provide high-efficiency scrambling and random order substitution. The high-efficiency scrambling is designed to separate adjacent pixels into different positions rapidly, while the random order substitution is used to change the pixel values using a pseudo-random order that is determined by the chaotic sequence. Following four rounds of scrambling and diffusion operations, a plain-image can be encrypted to be an unrecognized cipher-image. Next, we present each step of the LSC-LES in detail.
Key distribution
The secret key determines the initial states of the LSC map. According to the discussions in [1] , the key space of a chaos-based cryptosystem must reach the size of 2 100 to resist various attacks. The secret key length in the LSC-IES is set as 256 bits, and therefore its key space is 2 256 . Fig. 2 illustrates the structure of the secure key. It can be observed that it consists of five parts K = { x 0 , p 0 , d, g, H } . Among these, ( x 0 , p 0 ) are the original initial states, d is the perturbation parameter to disturb the original initial states, g is the coefficient of the initial states, and H = { H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 } contains four coefficients for the perturbation parameter. Each of x 0 , p 0 , d , g , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 has a length of 32 bits. The variables x 0 , p 0 , d are float numbers within [0,1), and each can be obtained from a 32-bit stream by 
Thereafter, the initial states for the four encryption rounds can be calculated as follows:
, the LSC map can generate randomly distributed chaotic sequences for the high-efficiency scrambling and random order substitution.
High-efficiency scrambling
The high-efficiency scrambling is designed to decorrelate the high correlations of adjacent pixels. It is performed within a square matrix L 2 × L 2 , where L is the block size. Supposing that the plain-image to be encrypted has a size of M × N , the block size L is obtained as
where α is the floor operation to obtain the greatest integer that is not larger than α. Fig. 3 displays a straightforward diagram of the high-efficiency scrambling. It can be observed that the image to be encrypted is divided into L 2 blocks. The pixels in each row are first randomly permutated into different blocks according to the generated chaotic sequences, following which their positions in each block are also randomly determined using other chaotic sequences. The overall procedures of the high-efficiency scrambling are described as follows. To provide an improved demonstration of the high-efficiency scrambling procedure, we provide a numeral example to illustrate each step, using a plain-image with a size of 4 × 4. According to the calculation in Eq. (4) , the block size L = 2 . Firstly, the two index matrices O and Q are generated from the chaotic sequences. Suppose that the obtained O and Q values are as follows:
The index matrix O determines which block a pixel permutes to, and Q decides the position of a pixel within a block. Fig. 4 illustrates the mapping procedures between the plain-image P and scrambling result T using the two index matrices O and Q . The detailed mapping procedures are as follows.
• The 1 st row of O is (2, 1, 4, 3) and its determined positions in Q are (Q 2 , 1 , Q 1 , 2 , Q 4 , 3 , Q 3 , 4 ) = (4 , 1 , 1 , 2) . Then, the four pixels in the 1 st row of P are permuted to the 4 th cell of the 2 nd block (position (2, 4)), the 1 st cell of the 1 st block (position (1, 1)), the 1 st cell of the 4 th block (position (3, 3)), and the 2 nd cell of the 3 rd block (position (3, 2)), respectively. That is,
• The 2 nd row of O is (4, 2, 3, 1) and its determined positions in Q are (Q 4 , 1 , 4) . Then, the four pixels in the 2 nd row of P are permuted to the 2 nd cell of the 4 th block (position (3, 4)), the 2 nd cell of the 2 nd block (position (1, 4)), the 4 th cell of the 3 rd block (position (4, 2)), and the 4 th cell of the 1 st block (position (2, 2)), respectively. That is,
. Then, the four pixels in the 3 rd row of P are permuted to the 1 st cell of the 3 rd block (position (3, 1)), the 4 th cell of the 4 th block (position (4, 4)), the 2 nd cell of the 1 st block (position (1, 2)), and the 1 st cell of the 2 nd block (position (1, 3)), respectively. That is,
. Then, the four pixels in the 4 th row of P are permuted to the 3 rd cell of the 1 st block (position (2, 1)), the 3 rd cell of the 3 rd block (position (4, 1)), the 3 rd cell of the 2 nd block (position (2, 3)), and the 3 rd cell of the 4 th block (position (4, 3)), respectively. That is,
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo-code of the high-efficiency scrambling.
Image rotation
The image rotation operation involves rotating the image clockwise by 90 °As high-efficiency scrambling is performed within the range of L 2 × L 2 , and the block size is obtained by Eq. (4) , only pixels within the range of L 2 × L 2 can be processed. For an image of size M × N , all of its pixels can be scrambled only when it satisfies L = √ M = √ N . To ensure that all pixels can be shuffled, we rotate the image 90 °clockwise following each high-efficiency scrambling.
Algorithm 1 High-efficiency scrambling.
Input: Image P of size M × N and initial state (x (i ) 
Q i, j = IY n ; 15: end for 16 : end for 17: for i = 1 to L 2 do 18: for j = 1 to L 2 do 19 :
T (x, y ) = P (i, j) ; 24: end for 25 : end for Fig. 5 . An example of determining substitution order. Matrix I is an index matrix obtained from a chaotic matrix, and T is the image to be processed.
Random order substitution
The substitution changes the pixel values and diffuses a small difference in the plain-image to all pixels of the cipherimage. Most existing substitution algorithms diffuse the change in pixel values row by row and column by column, or by following certain fixed rules. These fixed rules provide valuable information for security attacks. To overcome this drawback and obtain a higher level of security, we design a random order substitution. The substitution order relies on an index matrix, which is generated using the chaotic sequence. Fig. 5 presents a numeral example of the manner in which to determine the substitution order using an index matrix with an image size 4 × 4. The matrix I is an index matrix obtained by sorting each column of a chaotic matrix, and T is the image to be processed. It can be observed that the first row of I is (3, 1, 2, 4) and its determined substitution order is (3, 1) → (1, 2) → (2, 3) → (4, 4); the second row of I is (1, 2, 3, 2) and its determined substitution order is (1, 1) → (2, 2) → (3, 3) → (2, 4); the third row of I is (4, 3, 1, 3) and its determined substitution order is (4, 1) → (3, 2) → (1, 3) → (3, 4); and the fourth row of I is (2, 4, 4, 1) and its determined substitution order is (2, 1) → (4, 2) → (4, 3) → (1, 4). The first pixel in each iteration is changed by the final pixel in the previous iteration, and the first pixel in the first iteration is changed by the final pixel in the final iteration. Therefore, we can obtain a substitution circle, as indicated by T in Fig. 5 . With the determined substitution order, we can randomly change the current pixel using the previous one and the chaotic sequence. Suppose that the high-efficiency scrambling result T and generated chaotic matrix S both have sizes of M × N , and I is an index matrix obtained by sorting each column of S . The random order substitution can be described as follows:
where the function α is used to obtain the greatest integer that is not larger than α, and F is the number of intensity levels; for example, F = 256 if every pixel is presented using 8 bits. The substitution in the decryption process carries out the inverse operation using the same substitution order, which can be defined as:
It should be noted that the substitution order in the decryption process is the exact opposite.
Performance evaluation of generated chaotic maps
The chaotic maps produced by the CTBCS exhibit complex chaotic behaviors. To demonstrate this property, we estimate the chaos performance of the three 1D chaotic maps produced by the CTBCS, and compare these with the chaotic maps produced by Zhou's method in [47] and their seed maps. The comparisons are performed in terms of bifurcation diagrams, Lyapunov exponents [47] , and sample entropy [33] .
Bifurcation diagram
The bifurcation diagram of a dynamical system plots its visited or approximately visited points in a phase plane. It provides a visualized method to exhibit the chaotic system behaviors. Fig. 6 presents the bifurcation diagrams of the LSC, STC, and TLC maps as well as their seed maps. The three seed maps, namely the Logistic, Sine, and Tent maps, have fixed or periodic points in most parameter settings. Moreover, their output states are only distributed in a small part of the phase plane. However, the three generated chaotic maps exhibit complicated behaviors in all parameter ranges, and their output states are randomly distributed in the entire phase plane, indicating that they have robust chaotic behaviors and their outputs are more random. Fig. 7 . Comparisons between various generated chaotic maps and their seed maps in terms of LE: (a) LSC map generated by CTBCS and LS map generated by ZBC [47] ; (b) STC map generated by CTBCS and ST map generated by ZBC [47] ; (c) TLC map generated by CTBCS and TL map generated by ZBC [47] .
Lyapunov exponent
Because chaotic behavior is one type of observed behavior, researchers from different fields have different viewpoints regarding the existence of chaos. Among many technologies for evaluating chaos, the Lyapunov exponent (LE) is a commonly accepted metric that describes the separation degree of two trajectories of a dynamical system, starting from extremely close initial points. It can be described using Definition 1 .
Definition 1. The LE of a first-order difference equation
where is a very small positive value.
An LE greater than 0 means that two trajectories of a chaotic system will diverge exponentially in each iteration. Thus, a dynamical system is considered to exhibit chaotic behaviors if it can obtain a positive LE. A larger LE means that the trajectories diverge faster, indicating superior chaos performance. Fig. 7 plots the LEs of the chaotic maps produced by the CTBCS and ZBC [47] with their used seed maps. The LSC map (CTBCS), STC map (CTBCS), TLC map (CTBCS), LS map (ZBC), ST map (ZBC), and TL map (ZBC) can obtain positive LEs in every parameter setting, while the used seed maps have positive LEs in only a few parameters. This indicates that both the CTBCS and ZBC can generate new chaotic maps that have wider chaotic ranges than their seed maps. Furthermore, it can be observed that, utilizing the same seed maps, the CTBCS can produce chaotic maps with significantly larger LEs than ZBC. This demonstrates that the proposed CTBCS is able to produce chaotic maps with more complex chaotic behaviors.
Sample entropy
The sample entropy (SE) was developed to describe the complexity of a time series [33] . It provides a quantitative description of the similarity of outputs produced by dynamical systems, and is defined in Definition 2 . The dimension m and distance r are usually set as 2 and 0.2 × std , respectively, where std indicates the standard deviation of the tested time series. A larger SE demonstrates a lower degree of regularity of the time series; that is, higher complexity of the corresponding dynamical system. 
where A and B are the numbers of vectors having d[ X m +1 (i ) , X m +1 ( j)] < r and d [ X m ( i ), X m ( j )] < r , respectively. The template vector X m (i )
is the Chebyshev distance [2] between X m ( i ) and X m ( j ), and r is the given distance. Fig. 8 compares the SEs of the chaotic maps produced by the CTBCS and ZBC [47] with their seed maps. In each comparison, new chaotic maps are first produced by the CTBCS and ZBC using the same seed maps, following which the SEs of Fig. 8 . Comparisons among various generated chaotic maps and their seed maps in terms of SE: (a) LSC map generated by CTBCS and LS map generated by ZBC [47] ; (b) STC map generated by CTBCS and ST map generated by ZBC [47] ; (c) TLC map generated by CTBCS and TL map generated by ZBC [47] . the generated chaotic maps and their seed maps are calculated. It can be observed that the chaotic maps produced by the CTBCS have significantly larger SEs compared to those produced by ZBC and their used seed maps. This indicates that the CTBCS can produce chaotic maps with more complex output sequences.
Simulation results and security analysis of LSC-IES
This section implements the proposed LSC-IES in the MATLAB software and analyzes its security. The test images are mainly obtained from the USC-SIPI "Miscellaneous" 1 , the USC-SIPI "Aerials" 2 and the BOWS-2 3 image datasets. The USC-SIPI "Miscellaneous" consists of 44 images, including 16 color and 28 monochrome images. The USC-SIPI "Aerials" dataset consists of 38 images, including 37 color and 1 monochrome. The BOWS-2 contains 10,0 0 0 original images used in the 2nd BOWS Contest.
Simulation results
An encryption algorithm should be capable of encrypting different types of digital images into cipher-images with high security levels. Only by using the correct secret key can one completely recover the information of the original image. Without the correct secret key, one cannot obtain any information regarding the original image. Fig. 9 illustrates the encrypted results of the LSC-IES using different types of images. The grayscale image is selected from the USC-SIPI "Miscellaneous" dataset, and the color image is from the USC-SIPI "Aerials" dataset. When a color image is encrypted, its three color channels are encrypted independently. As can be observed, the five test images have various patterns, but LSC-IES can encrypt these to be cipher-images with random distributions. Attackers experience difficulties in obtaining the original information from their pixel distribution. As each step is completely reversible, the proposed LSC-IES can fully recover the original images from the corresponding cipher-images.
An image encryption algorithm should exhibit high encryption efficiency. Because the LSC map used has a rapid implementation speed, the high-efficiency scrambling and random order substitution have low computational complexity. Thus, the LSC-IES can achieve a fast encryption speed. Table 2 lists the required times of encrypting one image with different sizes using various image encryption algorithms. The experiments are performed on a computer under the following environments: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700 CPU @ 3.60 GHz with 8 GB memory, Windows 10 operating system. It can be observed that, for different image sizes, the proposed LSC-IES exhibits faster encryption speeds than other encryption algorithms.
An image encryption algorithm is also required to produce decrypted images with high quality. In the LSC-LES encryption operation, a slight difference of a pixel in the plain-image can influence all pixels in the cipher-image, which can guarantee that the cipher-images exhibit high security levels. However, in the decryption operation, a slight difference of a pixel in the cipher-image can influence only a few pixels of the decrypted result. In this case, if a cipher-image encrypted by the LSC-IES loses a certain amount of data, the decryption process can also recover most visual contents of the original image. Fig. 10 illustrates the image quality of the decrypted results when the cipher-images of the LSC-IES suffer from noise or different data loss percentages. It can be observed from Fig. 10 (a) that, when the cipher-image experiences no data loss, the decryption procedure can completely recover the original image. However, even when the cipher-images have noise or lose some data, their decrypted results contain the most visual information of the original images, as can be observed from Figs. 10 (b) to (e). Thus, the proposed LSC-IES can decrypt cipher-images with high quality.
Security analysis
To demonstrate the superiority of the LSC-IES, this section analyzes its security level in terms of the following four aspects: key security, randomness of cipher-images, ability to resist differential attacks, and adjacent pixel correlation. To illustrate the effectiveness of the LSC-IES further, we compare it with the following advanced image encryption methods: WWZ [36] , ZBC1 [47] , XLLH [40] , LSZ [30] , HZ [18] , ZBC2 [46] , WZNS [38] , LLZ [28] , and CKW [3] . For these competing image encryption schemes, several test results are reported in the reference papers and some of their source codes can be accessed.
To conduct a fair comparison, we report the test results of the competing encryption algorithms as follows. Firstly, if the experimental results of the algorithm have been reported by authors, we reference the reported results directly. Next, if the experimental results have not been reported but the algorithm source codes can be accessed, we run the source codes to obtain the experimental results. Finally, if neither the experimental results nor source codes can be obtained, we implement the algorithm to obtain the experimental results.
Key security analysis
The key size of an encryption algorithm should be appropriate. The key space of the LSC-IES is 2 256 , which satisfies the key size requirements and exhibits high performance in resisting various security attacks [1] . Moreover, an encryption algorithm should be extremely sensitive with its secret key. Otherwise, incorrect secret keys with slight differences may also correctly decrypt the information of the original image, which may make the actual key space smaller than the theoretical one [1] .
The number of bit change rate (NBCR) defined in [4] can be used to test the key sensitivity of the LSC-IES. For two images B 1 and B 2 , the NBCR is defined as
where Ham (B 1 , B 2 ) is the Hamming distance of B 1 and B 2 , and Len is the bit length of B 1 or B 2 . From Eq. (11) , we can determine that, if the obtained NBCR approaches 50%, the two images B 1 and B 2 are totally different. Our experiment is established as follows. For a given secret key K 1 , we change one of its 256 bits to obtain K 2 . To test the key sensitivity in the encryption process, we first encrypt the plain-image P using K 1 and K 2 , respectively, and generate two cipher-images C 1 and C 2 . Subsequently, the NBCR values of C 1 and C 2 are calculated. To test the key sensitivity in the decryption process, we first decrypt the cipher-image C 1 using K 1 and K 2 , respectively, and obtain two decrypted results Fig. 11 . Sensitivity analysis of secret key: (a) NBCR between C 1 and C 2 , where C 1 and C 2 are two encrypted images obtained from two secret keys with one bit difference; and (b) NBCR between D 1 and D 2 , where D 1 and D 2 are two decrypted results from two secret keys with one bit difference. (c) cipher-image C 1 = Enc(P 1 , K ) ; (d) cipher-image C 2 = Enc(P 2 , K ) ; and (e) difference | C 1 − C 2 | . D 1 and D 2 . Then, the NBCR values of D 1 and D 2 are calculated. Fig. 11 illustrates the key sensitivity analysis results of the LSC-IES. It is indicated that, when any one bit of the secret key is changed, the two obtained cipher-images and decrypted images are completely different. This means that the LSC-IES has an extremely sensitive secret key.
Ability to resist differential attacks
The differential attack is a commonly used and an efficient security attack. By studying the manner in which the differences in plain-images can influence cipher-images, the differential attack aims to build a relationship between plain-images and their corresponding cipher-images. An image encryption scheme exhibits high performance in resisting differential attacks if it possesses the diffusion property. The diffusion property indicates that a slight change in the plaintexts can spread over the entire data in the ciphertexts. Fig. 12 illustrates the diffusion property of the LSC-IES. When changing one bit of a plain-image, the two cipher-images encrypted by the LSC-IES are independent and different, as can be observed in Fig. 12 (e) .
The number of pixel change rate (NPCR) and uniform average change intensity (UACI) are two measures for testing whether an encryption algorithm can resist differential attacks [37] . The NPCR counts the number of different pixels, while the UACI calculates the average change in pixels between two images. Supposing that C 1 and C 2 are two cipher-images that their plain-images have only one bit difference, their NPCR and UACI values can be calculated asfollows:
where G is the number of pixels in an image, R indicates the largest allowed pixel value, and A records the difference between C 1 and C 2 , which is defined as
In recent years, strictly critical NPCR and UACI values were proposed in [37] . Given a significance level α, the critical NPCR score N * α is obtained as follows:
An image encryption algorithm offers a high ability to resist differential attacks if its obtained NPCR value is greater than N * α . The critical UACI scores (U * − α , U * + α ) with the given α can be obtained using
An encryption algorithm can pass the test if the calculated UACI value is within the range (U * − α , U * + α ) .
Our experiment uses the 25 grayscale images from the USC-SIPI "Miscellaneous" dataset as the test images. Among these images, seven images have a size of 256 × 256, 15 images have a size of 512 × 512, and the remaining four images have a size of 1024 × 1024. The significance level α is set as 0.05 in our experiment, as recommended by Wu et al. [37] . Then, for an image of size 256 × 256, N * 0 . 05 = 99 . 5693% and (U * − 0 . 05 , U * + 0 . 05 ) = (33 . 2824% , 33 . 6447%) ; for an image of size Table 3 NPCR results of various image encryption schemes. The image sizes images from "5.1.09" to "5.2.08", from "5.2.09" to "ruler.512", and from "5.3.01" to "testpat.1k" are 256 × 256, 512 × 512 and 1024 × 1024, respectively. The numbers in bold fonts are the test results that fail to pass the NPCR test.
File name
WWZ [36] ZBC1 [47] XLLH [40] LSZ [30] HZ [18] ZBC2 [46] WZNS [38] CKW [3] LSC-IES Table 4 UACI results of various image encryption schemes. The image sizes images from "5.1.09" to "5.2.08", from "5.2.09" to "ruler.512", and from "5.3.01" to "testpat.1k" are 256 × 256, 512 × 512, and 1024 × 1024, respectively. The numbers in bold fonts are the test results that fail to pass the UACI test.
File name WWZ [36] ZBC1 [47] XLLH [40] LSZ [30] HZ [18] ZBC2 [46] WZNS [38] CKW [ 
Randomness of cipher-images
The pixels of an ideal cipher-image are required to be uniformly distributed to resist statistic attacks. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP800-22 is an established criterion for measuring the randomness of data sequence [21] . It contains 15 sub-tests and uses a group of binary sequences as input. All sub-tests aim to identify the non-randomness areas of the binary sequences. Each sub-test produces a P − v alue for the group of binary sequences, and generates a p − v alue for every binary sequence. Our experiment sets the significance level α as 0.01, as recommended by III et al. [21] . The number of tested binary sequences should be larger than or equal to α −1 , and is 120 in our experiment.
The test results are interpreted from the following three perspectives: P − v alue, pass rate, and p − v alue T . The P − v alue interpretation checks the P − v alue s for all binary sequences and passes the test if the corresponding P − v alue is within the range [ α, 1] . The pass rate interpretation counts the pass proportion of the 120 binary sequences. Using the calculation method provided in [21] , the minimum pass rate T = 0 . 9628 when the number of binary sequences s = 120 and the significance level α = 0 . 01 . The p − v alue T interpretation collects the distribution of P − v alue s. It is calculated using the distribution of P − v alue according to the calculation method in [21] . If the generated p − v alue T is larger than 0.0 0 01, the test sequences are considered to pass the test.
Our experiment uses 120 digital images (filenames from "1.pgm" to "120.pgm") selected from the BOWS-2 database. First, these images are encrypted using the LSC-IES to obtain 120 cipher-images, and each cipher-image is then used as a binary sequence. As all test images have a size of 512 × 512 and every pixel is represented by 8 bits, a binary sequence has a bit length of 512 × 512 × 8 = 2 , 097 , 152 . Thus, our experiment uses 120 binary sequences as input, each of which has a length of 2,097,152 bits, and Table 5 lists the test results. It can be observed that the 120 images encrypted by the LSC-IES can pass all 15 sub-tests using the three interpretations. This indicates that the cipher-images of the LSC-IES exhibit high randomness.
Adjacent pixel correlation analysis
As data redundancy exists in natural images, the adjacent pixels of a natural image may exhibit high correlations. An image encryption algorithm needs to weaken these high correlations. The correlation of two pixel sequences can be calculated by where X and Y denote the two pixel sequences, μ is the mathematical expectation, and σ is the mathematical standard derivation. When testing the adjacent pixel correlation of an image, X is a selected pixel sequence and Y is the adjacent pixel sequence, and each pixel of Y is the horizontal, vertical, or diagonal neighbor pixel of X . If X and Y exhibit a high correlation, the obtained APC approaches 1 or -1; otherwise, it approaches 0.
To demonstrate the ability of the LSC-IES in terms of decorrelating natural images visually, we first select five images from the BOWS-2 image dataset (filenames from "1" to "5") and then encrypt these using the LSC-IES. Fig. 13 plots these adjacent pixel pairs of the plain-images and their cipher-images. A total of 10 0 0 pixel pairs are randomly selected from every image. It can be observed that, in each figure, the X-axis indicates the five images, while the Y-Z plane plots the values of the adjacent pixels. The adjacent pixel pairs of the plain-images are mostly on or close the diagonal lines, indicating that these adjacent pixels exhibit strong correlations. However, the adjacent pixel pairs of all cipher-images are distributed quite randomly across the Y-Z phase plane, demonstrating that they exhibit weak correlations. This indicates that the proposed LSC-IES can efficiently decorrelate the high correlations of the plain-images. Table 6 displays the APC values of the plain-image "Lena" and its cipher-images, encrypted by various image encryption methods. As the APC results of LLZ [28] , ZBC2 [46] , and WZNS [38] have been reported in [38] , and those of [18] have Table 6 Adjacent pixel correlations of plain-image "Lena" and its results using various image encryption methods.
Encryption schemes
Horizontal Vertical Diagonal "Lena" image 0.9400 0.9709 0.9710 FLMLC [12] 0.0368 0.0392 0.0068 ZBC1 [47] −0.0054 0.0045 0.0031 WZNS [38] 0.0053365 −0.0027616 0.0016621 WWZ [36] −0.026878 0.024223 −0.0 0 0569 XLLH [40] 0.0 0 0369 0.001441 0.002217 LSZ [30] −0.001458 −0.002029 0.001899 HZ [18] 0.0033455 −0.0 0 08454 −0.0 0 02044 ZBC2 [46] 0.002098 −0.0 0 0991 −0.001337 LLZ [28] 0.0127 −0.0190 −0.0012 CKW [3] 0.001381 0.0016061 0.002578 LSC-IES −0.003280 −0.0 0 0777 −0.0 0 0181 been reported in its literature, we reference these results directly. We implemented the other encryption algorithms in the MATLAB software and calculated their APC results. From the table, it can be observed that the LSC-IES outperforms LLZ [28] , FLMLC [12] , ZBC1 [47] , WZNS [38] , WWZ [36] , and HZ [18] in all the horizontal, vertical and diagonal directions, and has smaller absolute APC values than the remaining algorithms in two directions. This further demonstrates that the LSC-IES exhibits high efficiency in breaking the strong correlations of adjacent pixels in natural images.
Conclusion
This paper firstly proposed a cosine-transform-based chaotic system known as the CTBCS, which uses the cosine transform as a nonlinear transform to produce new chaotic maps with complex chaos performance. As examples, three new chaotic maps were produced to demonstrate the efficiency of the CTBCS. The performance evaluations demonstrated that the chaotic maps of the CTBCS exhibit significantly superior chaos performance over the chaotic maps produced by other methods and their seed maps. Using the LSC map generated by the CTBCS, we further proposed an image encryption scheme known as LSC-IES. The LSC-IES follows the well-known diffusion-confusion concept and we simulated it using different digital images. The security analysis indicated that the LSC-IES is quite sensitive to its secret keys, and has a higher security level than several competing image encryption algorithms. This work can promote the development of chaos theory and chaos-based encryption. We will investigate the further application of LSC-IES in video encryption.
